The principle of sufficient reason by Birkhoff, George David, 1884-1944
I1 
THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON 
outstanding characteristic of present-day civilization 
is the extraordinary rapidity of scientific advance, ac- 
companied by a veritable Babel of changing scientific 
theories. The  ceaseless flux has produced confusion in the 
minds of men. Even philosophy is affected by the prevailing 
uncertainties, and many assert that  its speculations are 
meaningless unless narrowly restrained to  the mathematical 
and logical fields. 
But philosophy has an answer ready for these detractors. 
For it has been Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, and other philoso- 
phers who first emphasized the basic significance of mathe- 
matics and logic; and it may be reasonably conjectured 
tha t  in the future, seers endowed with the requisite philo- 
sophic insight will again open up large vistas which the 
specialized scientist, mathematician, and logician are likely 
t o  miss. Only those are likely t o  contribute in this way 
who, like Plato, Aristotle, and Leibniz, have mastered the 
essence of contemporary scientific knowledge. Unfortunately 
the task of achieving this necessary synthesis is becoming 
a more and more difficult one. 
It will be recalled tha t  Plato had inscribed a t  the portals 
of his famous Academy, “Let no one ignorant of Geometry 
enter here.” His whole philosophic system affirmed the 
supreme importance of mathematical thought and of abstract 
Ideas generally, of which the concrete instances to be found 
in the actual world were held to  be merely inferior copies. 
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His contemporary, Aristotle, was the creator of formal logic. 
The  German mathematician and philosopher Leibniz has 
been regarded by some as Plato’s true successor in modern 
times. He too, emphasized the fundamental r81e of abstract 
thought for philosophy, and foresaw the possibility of a 
logical calculus such as is realized in modern symbolic 
logic. He said, “My metaphysics is all mathematics” and 
even went so far as t o  declare tha t  “The mathematicians 
have as much need of being philosophers as the philosophers 
of being mathematicians.” 
At the foundation of Leibniz’s philosophy were two logical 
principles t o  which he attached the greatest importance : the 
Principle of Contradiction and the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason. Both seem t o  have been explicitly adopted by him 
as early as the year 1686. The  first principle merely asserts 
t ha t  every proposition is either true or false-tertium non 
datur. Nearly everyone would admit without hesitation tha t  
this is a valid principle if not indeed a truism; and yet, 
strangely enough, its validity has been denied in the in- 
tuitionist logic of the Dutch mathematician Brouwer, who 
allows, as a kind of intermediate category, the proposition 
which admits neither of proof nor disproof. It is the second 
principle, in modified form, t o  which I wish t o  direct at- 
tention. 
It is desirable t o  recall in the first place Leibniz’s own 
formulation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason,l “ that  
every true proposition, which is not known per se, has an 
d priori proof, or, that  a reason can be given for every truth, 
or, as is commonly said, t ha t  nothing happens without a 
reason.” Leibniz adds tha t  “Arithmetic and Geometry do 
not need this Principle, but Physics and Mechanics do, and 
‘The translations here used are those of Bertrand Russell, “A Critical Exposi- 
tion of the Philosophy of Leibniz,” (Cambridge, England, 1900). 
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Archimedes employed it.” Furthermore he used the same 
principle for metaphysical purposes as the following remark- 
able conclusion, obviously based on this Principle, shows : 
“When two things which cannot both be together, are equally 
good; and neither in themselves nor by their combination 
with other things, has the one any advantage over the other: 
God will produce neither of them.” 
M y  primary purpose will be t o  show how a properly formu- 
lated Principle of Sufficient Reason plays a fundamental 
r81e in scientific thought and, furthermore, is t o  be regarded 
as of the greatest suggestiveness from the philosophic point 
of view.2 
I n  the preceding lecture I pointed out that  three branches 
of philosophy, namely Logic, Aesthetics, and Ethics, fall 
more and more under the sway of mathematical methods. 
Today I would make a similar claim that  the other great 
branch of philosophy, Metaphysics, in so far as it possesses 
a substantial core, is likely to undergo a similar fate. M y  
basis for this claim will be tha t  metaphysical reasoning al- 
ways relies on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and that  
the true meaning of this Principle is t o  be found in the 
“Theory of Ambiguity” and in the associated mathematical 
“Theory of Groups.” 
If I were a Leibnizian mystic, believing in his “pre- 
established harmony,” and the “best possible world” so 
satirized by Voltaire in “Candide,” I would say tha t  the 
metaphysical importance of the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
and the cognate Theory of Groups arises from the fact that  
God thinks multi-dimensionally3 whereas men can only 
think in linear syllogistic series, and the Theory of Groups is 
2As far as I am aware, only Scholastic Philosophy has fully recognized and ex- 
T h a t  is, uses multi-dimensional symbols beyond our grasp. 
ploited this principle as one of basic importance for philosophic thought. 
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the appropriate instrument of thought t o  remedy our de- 
ficiency in this respect. 
The  founder of the Theory of Groups was the mathemati- 
cian Evariste Galois. At the end of a long letter written in 
1832 on the eve of a fatal duel, t o  his friend Auguste 
Chevalier, the youthful Galois said in summarizing his 
mathematical “You know, my  dear Auguste, t ha t  
these subjects are not the only ones which I have explored. 
M y  chief meditations for a considerable time have been 
directed towards the application t o  transcendental Analysis 
of the theory of ambiguity. . . . But I have not the time, and 
my ideas are not yet well developed in this field, which is 
immense.” This passage shows how in Galois’s mind the 
Theory of Groups and the Theory of Ambiguity were 
interrelated.’ 
Unfortunately later students of the Theory of Groups 
have all too frequently forgotten that, philosophically 
speaking, the subject remains neither more nor less than the 
Theory of Ambiguity. I n  the limits of this lecture it is only 
possible to  elucidate by an elementary example the idea of a 
group and of the associated ambiguity. 
Consider a uniform square tile which is placed over a 
marked equal square on a table. Evidently it is then im- 
possible to  determine without further inspection which one 
of four positions the tile occupies. In  fact, if we designate 
its vertices in order by A, B, C, D, and mark the correspond- 
ing positions on the table, the four possibilities are for the 
corners A, B, C, D of the tile t o  appear respectively in the 
positions A, B, C, D; B, C, D, A ;  C, D, A, B ;  and D, A, B, C. 
These are obtained respectively from the first position by a 
‘My translation. 
6 I t  is of interest to recall that Leibniz was interested in ambiguity to the extent 
of using a special notation v (Latin, oel) for “or.” Thus the ambiguously defined 
roots 1, 5 of x2-6x+5=0 would be written x = l v 5  by him. 
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null rotation ( I ) ,  by a rotation through 90" (R), by a rotation 
through 180" (S), and by a rotation through 270" ( T ) .  
Furthermore the combination of any two of these rotations 
in succession gives another such rotation. Thus a rotation R 
through 90" followed by a rotation S through 180" is equiva- 
lent t o  a single rotation T through 270", Le., R S  = T. Con- 
sequently, the "group" of four operations I ,  R, s, T has 
the "multiplication table" shown here: 
S 
This table fully characterizes the group, and shows the exact 
nature of the underlying ambiguity of position. 
More generally, any collection of operations such that  
the resultant of any two performed in succession is one of 
them, while there is always some operation which undoes 
what any operation does, forms a "group." 
I n  the discussion of our main topic we turn first to some 
illustrations of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in the 
mathematical and physical domains. In  the biological and 
psychological domains there appears t o  be as yet no scope 
for the Principle, due perhaps t o  the fact that  our knowledge 
is not yet deep enough in these more complicated fields; 
however, it will be seen that  in a certain metaphysical sense, 
the Principle is already of speculative importance for bio- 
logical thought. I n  the social domain i t  will be possible t o  
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point out how the Principle plays a decisive r61e in certain 
special problems; but here our knowledge is still less. 
Finally, I shall attempt a general quasi-mathematical for- 
mulation of the Principle itself, and venture a heuristic 
conjecture as t o  its ultimate r61e in scientific and philo- 
sophic thought. 
Let us begin with some simple remarks concerning the 
nature of the ordinary complex number-system which, of 
course, is the most important technical weapon of mathe- 
matics. I n  the first place, we may note tha t  there is a kind 
of similarity between the processes of addition and of multi- 
plication, which is not so complete as t o  give rise t o  essential 
ambiguity, but yet is extensive enough t o  permit of the 
invention of logarithms replacing multiplication by addition, 
Secondly, there is a thorough-going similarity between the 
relations of “greater than” (> )  and “less than” (<), holding 
between pairs of numbers. But, more significantly still, the 
number-system is finally regarded as completed by the 
inclusion of the “imaginary unit,” i = 2 / 7 ;  and this unit 
is essentially ambiguous in that one might equally well 
write i =  -47. I n either case we have the basic equation 
i2 = - 1. Here the underlying group has only two operations, 
A, B, respectively taking i into itself and into its negative, 
with the multiplication table: 
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Suppose that  there be given an algebraic equation with real 
coefficients (as for instance x 2 - 2 x + 2  =O),  with one imagin- 
ary root, a+bi (l+i for the quadratic equation just men- 
tioned). Then without further argument, on the basis of our 
Principle alone, it follows that  a - b i  (1 -i in the special 
case) is also a root of the equation. For why should a+bi be 
a root any more than a - b i ?  The usual proof that a - b i  
is also a root, involves the property of a complex number 
a+&, that, if it vanishes, both the real coefficient a and the 
imaginary coefficient b vanish separately. 
This example is so illuminating that it is worth while t o  
state the underlying argument based on the Principle a little 
more fully: 
(1) The  ordinary complex number system is regarded as 
given, and contains the imaginary unit i; and it is ob- 
served that if i be replaced by -i the set of underlying 
postulates still holds, with the modified imaginary unit -i; 
(2) It is given that  x=a+bi  is a root of an algebraic 
equation with real coefficients f ( x )  =0, i.e., f ( a + b i )  = O ;  
(3) Changing i t o  -i throughout, we infer without further 
argument thatf(a-bi)  =O, in other words that  a - b i  is also 
a root. It is t o  be noted that, since the coefficients of the 
equation are real, the equation itself is not altered when i 
is replaced by -i. 
There is also a kindred suggestive general algebraic 
principle, that  when numbers are algebraically defined in an 
unambiguous manner, they are rationally known, Le., are 
given by ordinary fractions. It was by means of the exten- 
sion of this last principle to  ambiguously-defined algebraic 
quantities (e.g., as 2/2r ambiguously defined by x2  =2) ,  and 
the related theory of Permutation Groups that Galois was 
able to formulate a definitive theory of the solution of 
algebraic equations by radicals. 
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A more important use of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason is afforded by elementary Euclidean geometry. 
Here the “group of motions” is the one which is important. 
The  operations of this group move geometrical figures in 
space without changing their dimensions, and thus allow us 
t o  determine the congruence of figures by superposition. 
As a very simple illustration, consider an isosceles triangle 
ABC with given LABC, and given equal sides BA =BC. 
Clearly the Principle of Sufficient Reason indicates that  
B 
the base angle, LBAC, is equal t o  the other base angle, 
LBCA. For why should it be greater rather than less? 
In  fact, if we turn the triangle over so that BC takes the 
position BA, then BA must fall along the line BC, while 
the point A must coincide with C. But, philosophically 
speaking, the gist of the argument depends on the Principle 
of Sufficient Reason rather than upon a use of superposition. 
Now there is inherent in geometry a more extensive am- 
biguity than that of congruent figures, namely that of similar 
figures. According to  Couturat‘ the corresponding larger 
group of similitudes is really the one appropriate t o  an 
approach to  geometry from the standpoint of intuition 
(Sufficient Reason). 
In  Leibniz’s own attempt to  construct a “geometric cal- 
culus” of position, he makes various uses of the group of 
similitudes, but finally abandons it in favor of the Euclidean 
EL. Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz (Paris, I~OI), pp. 410-416. 
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group of motions. Couturat believes that  this was the 
basic reason for Leibniz’s lack of success in his geometric 
calculus. Nevertheless Leibniz’s attempt was of the highest 
interest: for Boole in his Algebra of Logic and Grassmann in 
his Calculus of Extension “later justified the most daringcon- 
ceptions of Leibniz, in showing that  these were not dreams, 
but prophetic intuitions which anticipated by nearly two 
centuries the progress of science and the human spirit.”’ 
Possibly a simple system of postulates of my own for 
geometry’ is nearest in spirit t o  the suggestion of Couturat’s, 
for my approach is based on the group of translations (scale), 
the group of rotations (protractor), and the group of expan- 
sions of figures about a fixed point (pantograph), and these 
are the three principal “subgroups” making up the group of 
similitudes in the plane. 
Indeed, in any mathematical approach to geometry, it will 
be found that  the choice of postulates is largely determined 
by considerations based on an underlying group, whether 
that  of motions as in Euclid or of similitudes as suggested by 
Couturat, or of some other group like the so-called projective 
group. 
It may be remarked in passing that for the primitive mind 
unacquainted with formal geometrical truth, the form of 
the circle, as embodied in the full moon, for instance, must 
have symbolized somehow the essential characteristics of the 
group of rotations about the center of the circle and of the 
associated ambiguity of all directions through the center. 
It is interesting that Leibniz himself had the erroneous 
belief that, with a more thoroughgoing use of his Principles of 
Contradiction and of Sufficient Reason, i t  would be possible 
t o  prove the familiar axioms of Euclid. Thus he says: “Far 
‘My translation of Couturat. 
8Annals of A4athematics, vol. 33 (1932), pp. 329-315. 
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from approving the acceptance of doubtful principles, I 
would have people seek even the demonstration of the axioms 
of Euclid. . . . And when I am asked the means of knowing 
and examining innate principles I reply . . . t ha t  . . . we must 
t r y  to  reduce them t o  first principles, Le., t o  axioms which 
are identical or immediate by means of definitions which are 
nothing but a distinct exposition of ideas.” 
Another very important mathematical subject in which 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason enters is t ha t  of the Theory 
of Probability. If a coin is tossed, i t  is regarded as equally 
probable that  the coin fall heads or tails in the successive 
throws. For how can the irrelevant marking on the two 
sides of the coin make either side more likely than the other ? 
It is clear that  the weightiest practical decisions must 
generally be guided by similar estimates of probability, 
whether these be in the successful conduct of the affairs 
of a nation, a business house, or an individual. 
It is, however, in physics tha t  one finds still more re- 
markable instances of the application of the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason. Only a few of these can be sketched here, 
of course. 
We will begin with the case of two “equal forces” F 
acting upon a point P.’ If we admit that  these are equivalent 
t o  a single resultant force R, then it is obvious from our 
Principle that  the resultant must lie in the plane of the two 
forces. For why should it lie upon one side of this plane 
rather than upon the other? Here the tacit assumption is 
t ha t  the associated group is once more the group of motions 
characteristic of ordinary geometry. It is clear, for the 
same reason, t ha t  this resultant must fall along the internal 
bisector of the lines of the two forces (see the figure). 
SA similar application is to a balance with equal weights in the two pans of the 
balance. 
34 Lectures on Scientific Subjects 
P 
Furthermore, by a more elaborate but valid use of the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason, we may prove that in general 
the resultant of any two forces murt be that given by the 
familiar Parallelogram Lawlo. This is the type of "proof" 
used for instance by the French astronomer and mathemati- 
cian Laplace in his fiIe'canique Cileste. 
Much of classical mechanics may be approached in a 
similar spirit. For example, the attracting gravitational 
force acting between two point masses must evidently lie 
along the line joining the two masses, by the same Principle; 
and the forces of action and reaction must be equal -for why 
should one force be greater than the other ?-and there can 
be no absolute unit of length-for why is one unit to be 
preferred rather than another? Thus it follows from the 
Principle that the attractive force varies as some power of 
the distance. 
If now we further impose the (philosophically reasonable) 
requirement that  the mutual interaction is small at  large dis- 
tances apart, we find that the force must vary as some nega- 
tive power of the distance. Thus we are led practically to  
the inverse first or second powers by use of the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason alone; and the planetary laws of Kepler 
indicate at  once tha t  the inverse second power of Newton has 
t o  be chosen. Thus from the standpoint of the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason, based on the ambiguity of the group of 
'Osee the Note appended to  this lecture. 
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motions and similitudes, the gravitational law of Newton 
appears as almost inevitable. 
It is worthy of remark in this connection that  Leibniz, 
searching for the invariable “substances” underlying the 
changing appearance of mechanical systems such as the solar 
system, was led t o  formulate the laws of the conservation of 
momentum, and of energy or vis viva, so important for 
modern physics. 
Another instructive illustration of the power of the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason in certain physical questions is 
furnished by the following special problem. Suppose that  a 
uniform square sheet of metal has two opposite sides main- 
tained a t  the freezing point of water ( O O C . )  while the other 
two sides are maintained a t  the boiling point of water 
(100°C.). Suppose further that  no heat is conducted away 
except along the edges, and that  the additivity of states of 
temperature is assumed. It is asked, on the basis of these 
very scanty assumptions : what are the permanent tem- 
peratures set up along the two diagonals? 
The Principle of Sufficient Reason alone suffices t o  show 
that  along these two lines the temperature must be every- 
where exactly 50°C. I n  fact, rotate the square by half a 
revolution about the diagonal AC (see the above figure), so 
tha t  pairs of adjacent sides are interchanged while the 
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individual points of the diagonal AC remain fixed. By the 
additivity assumed, the resultant combined temperature 
will be 100” along all of the sides and double the temperature 
along the fixed diagonal. But if the temperature is per- 
manently 100°C. along the boundary, it will be 100°C. 
everywhere inside, so that  the temperature all along the 
diagonal AC must have been exactly 50°C.; and the same 
must be true along the other diagonal BD. 
Evidently this is a remarkable conclusion, made on the 
basis of limited assumptions without any calculation ! This 
is possible because of the peculiar symmetry of the problem 
which permits the use of the underlying group of rotations 
of the square in order t o  arrive a t  a precise quantitative 
result. 
These illustrations are sufficient t o  show the exceedingly 
great suggestiveness of the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
for physics. It has been used, more or less tacitly, in 
almost all classical physics of the Newtonian type. 
However, in the subsequent electromagnetic era inaugu- 
rated by Faraday and Maxwell, it seemed until the beginning 
of the present century as though the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason had no important part t o  play. I n  fact, the ordinary 
group of motions in no way suggested the peculiar laws 
interrelating the electric and magnetic lines of force visual- 
ized by Faraday. Here one was apparently confronted by 
mysterious entities of non-mechanical nature which were 
entirely foreign t o  ordinary physical intuition. 
It is therefore a striking fact that  in 1908 the  mathemati- 
cian Minkowski found a more natural way of looking a t  the 
phenomena of electromagnetism. He discovered that  by 
introducing as basic a certain “Lorentz” group instead of the 
group of motions, the observed laws lost their apparent 
artificiality and took on a character of inevitability from a 
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higher, group-theoretic point of view. Minkowski foresaw 
clearly the importance of this forward step, made shortly 
before his death. 
The Lorentz group is applicable to  a (3 +l)-dimensional 
space-time, and is made up of operations which mix up the 
three space coordinates and the single time coordinate of 
two systems in relative motion. At low velocities compared 
to  that  of light, the quantitative difference between the 
group of Euclidean motions’l and the Lorentz group is 
insignificant. 
The point of view of Minkowski is consonant with that  of 
the special theory of relativity of Einstein (1905) and has 
been universally adopted in dealing with electromagnetism. 
It permits us t o  write in a quite legitimate way the mystical 
equation 
186,300 miles =a seconds. 
It also enables us t o  answer in similar fashion the question: 
Why is space three-dimensional, and why is time one- 
dimensional? The  answer is that  a theory of electromagnetic 
type can be proved t o  be possible only in the case of a 
three-dimensional space and a one-dimensional time! 
Here it is interesting t o  recall that  Leibniz, as a systematic 
philosopher, considered tha t  the fact t ha t  space was three- 
dimensional followed as a geometric necessity from the usual 
axioms of geometry, for he says: “The triple number of 
dimensions is determined, not by the reason of the best 
[;.e., not by a special application of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason], but by a geometrical necessity: it is because geom- 
eters have been able t o  show tha t  there are only three 
mutually perpendicular straight lines which can intersect 
in the same point.’’ Here of course Leibniz was entirely 
“Together with a change in origin of time. 
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wrong, since n-dimensional Euclidean geometry is just as 
possible as three-dimensional. However, if he were living 
today, he would undoubtedly “explain” the triple dimen- 
sionality of space on the electromagnetic basis outlined 
above. 
A somewhat analogous situation arises for number systems 
of so-called non-commutative type, different from ordinary 
numbers and yet permitting of the operation of division: 
here the only type is essentially that  of the four-dimensional 
quaternions discovered by the Irish mathematician William 
Rowan Hamilton. 
It was Minkowski’s paper of 1908 which stimulated Ein- 
stein to  formulate his general gravitational theory of 1915.In 
this theory, too, the Principle of Sufficient Reason played a 
notable part, for it was the complete directional am- 
biguity of space about the central Sun which alone enabled 
Einstein t o  draw his conclusions. He did not explicitly 
appeal t o  the Principle, but it was used just the same. As a 
matter of fact, the gravitational theory of relativity has so 
far only been successfully applied in this very special, 
highly symmetrical case of a large spherical mass. 
In  passing it may be observed that Einstein’s general theory 
of relativity in its first form can itself effectively be criti- 
cized on the basis of the same Principle of Sufficient Reason! 
I n  fact, if there were only a single central body, this body 
might be rotating according to that theory. But with respect 
t o  what could it rotate? 
It is remarkable that  Leibniz himself should have been 
led t o  take a specifically relativistic point of view towards 
space and time. No doubt this suited him because it stood 
in opposition t o  the absolutistic point of view of his great 
rival Newton. But Leibniz was led to  adopt this position 
primarily through the Principle of Sufficient Reason, as the 
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following quotation shows: “I hold space, and also time, t o  
be something purely relative. Space is an order of coexist- 
enceJ as time is an order of successions. Space denotes in 
terms of possibility an order of things which, in so far as 
they exist together, exist a t  the same time, whatever be their 
several ways of existing.” Again he says, “There are many 
ways of refuting the imagination of those who take space t o  
be a substance, or at  least something absolute. I say that,  if 
space were an absolute Being, it would be impossible t o  give 
a sufficient reason for anything tha t  might happen, yet this 
principle is with us an axiom.” He then goes on t o  give a 
proof of his assertion, based on the indistinguishability of 
different points of ideal space and of different instants of 
ideal time, which makes it inconceivable tha t  Deity selects 
any one point or instant in preference t o  others. Here 
evidently i t  is the ambiguity of space corresponding t o  the 
group of motions, and the ambiguity of time corresponding 
to  the group of time measurements, t ha t  brings in the 
Principle. 
Thus once more a great philosopher has revealed a pro- 
phetic insight; and it may be added tha t  the French philos- 
opher Bergson was led on purely philosophical grounds t o  
formulate the (relativistic) idea of “local time” even before 
Lorentz and Einstein were led t o  do so on the basis of the 
celebrated Michelson-Morley experiment and the equations 
of Maxwell. 
I n  the latest quantum-mechanical phase of physics, the 
attempt t o  maintain a conceptual grasp of physical law has 
been at  least temporarily abandoned in favor of a purely 
formal attack by means of mathematical guesswork. This 
process, it must be admitted, has so far been strikingly 
successful. Nevertheless I believe the day not t o  be far 
distant when less artificial methods must again be employed. 
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If before Newton’s time the laws of Kepler for the motion of 
two bodies had been used as a basis for similar shrewd con- 
jectures concerning the three-body problem presented by 
the Sun, Earth, and Moon, the proper formulas would 
probably have been obtained; for there were always the 
known observational facts t o  guide one ad hoc when in 
difficulty. It is such an ad hoc “explanation” that quantum- 
mechanics seems t o  me t o  provide for the treatment of 
spectroscopic and allied phenomena. Just as Newton’s law 
of gravitation, of conceptual type and largely based on the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason, would have displaced such an 
artificial treatment of the three-body problem, so we may 
expect an alternative conceptual approach t o  quantum- 
mechanical laws t o  be found and adopted. 
I n  the biological and psychological domains there is as 
yet little or no occasion t o  use the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason, except in the extremely vague way which we proceed 
t o  indicate. 
Physicists have always treated matter as mere dead stuff, 
although, from the philosophic point of view, matter must 
be thought of as the potential abode of life. This tacit hy- 
pothesis of the physicists is probably a useful one in our 
present stage of physical knowledge. But an unfortunate ef- 
fect of it has been t o  make matter seem alien t o  life, although 
recently there are signs that  the attitude of biologists is 
changing in this respect. 
However, Leibniz avoided this error of thought, for his 
theory of monads led him, a t  least in the early stages of his 
philosophical development, t o  locate souls in points, death 
itself being merely the contraction of a monad dominating an 
“entelechy” t o  a single point. The  Leibnizian employment 
of the Aristotelian concept of entelechy in order t o  explain 
the activity of living organisms may be regarded as an 
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important biological advance. Such an entelechy was based 
on the concept of a dominant monad in a monadic system. 
Leibniz envisaged the existence of continuous series of such 
monadic beings. These may be illustrated not only by cells 
and other organisms, but by insect communities, and by 
other forms as yet unknown. Leibniz said in this connection 
“I definitely avow that  there are in the world animals as 
much larger than ourselves, as we are larger than microscopic 
animalcules.” One is reminded in this connection of the 
incident related by his commentator Hantschius, t ha t  
Leibniz once remarked t o  him over a cup of coffee, “There 
may be in this cup a monad which will one day be a rational 
soul!” 
Of course the existence of monads was “deduced” from his 
fundamental Principles of Contradiction and Sufficient 
Reason, but i t  is difficult t o  see the cogency of Leibniz’ vi- 
talistic arguments. 
As far as this ever-recurring conflict between mechanistic 
and vitalistic points of view among biologists is concerned, 
i t  seems to  me that  i t  may be a t  once decided in favor of the 
vitalists by a reasonable philosophic use of the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason: f o r ,  no suficient reason f o r  the observed 
behavior of living organisms is to be found  in purely mechanical 
systems. For example, from a purely mathematical point of 
view a system of Newtonian type would necessarily exhibit 
a type of eternal Nietzschean recurrence, foreign t o  living 
things! 
In  the fivefold hierarchy of the levels of knowledge- 
mathematical, physical, biological, psychological, social-the 
social level is of course the most complex and difficult of 
all. Nevertheless it is already clear that  the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason is likely t o  play a definite rBle in certain 
technical problems. 
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M y  first illustration is taken from the question of the 
proper apportionment among the several states of the as- 
signed total of Representatives in Congress (referred to  in 
the preceding lecture). Huntington has emphasized the fact 
that  the prevailing Willcox system of apportionment is based 
on the individual share, n / N  (N=population, n =number of 
Representatives), whereas there is an ignored but symmetric 
system based on the idea of the Congressional district N / n .  
Huntington’s own system is of an intermediate type, favor- 
ing neither the Congressional district nor individual share. 
It seems obvious then that, from the point of view of our 
Principle as i t  would have been interpreted by Leibniz, the 
Huntington system is t o  be logically preferred to  either of 
the other two systems. 
M y  second illustration will be taken from the field of the 
law, and I am much indebted to  my colleague Roscoe Pound 
for supplying me with it. The case presented is of the fol- 
lowing general character. Two small groups of individuals, 
A and B, request that  electric light facilities be extended 
from the town to  their respective nearby communities, the 
cost of this extension t o  be divided between them. How 
should the cost be allocated? As I understand it, the ac- 
cepted method would be as follows: All of the interests 
involved and reasonable ways of distributing the cost 
would be considered, and then a compromise would be struck 
between these. For example, the basis might be the num- 
ber of individuals served, or the amount of electricity to  
be used, or the costs of installation separately, etc. All 
these, in so far as really different and equally valid, would 
receive the same consideration in the final decision. It is 
assumed of course that the case has not been already dis- 
posed of by earlier precedents. Evidently this is the proper 
method of solution on the basis of our Principle. 
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These two examples suggest that, in the systematic treat- 
ment of ethical questions, the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
may sometimes afford the best way out of an otherwise 
insoluble problem. 
I n  conclusion I would like to  mention one major philosophic 
result t o  which the Principle of Sufficient Reason seems t o  
point. It is closely allied with Leibniz’ own conclusion that  
this is the best of all possible worlds, but in reality quite 
distinct from it. Leibniz elaborates this conclusion in his 
statement: “It follows from the supreme perfection of God 
that  in producing the universe he has chosen the best pos- 
sible plan, the greatest variety combined with the most 
perfect order; ground, place, times arranged as well as pos- 
sible; the maximum effect received by the simplest means; 
as much power, knowledge, well-being and goodness in 
creatures as the universe would admit. . . . Otherwise, it 
would be impossible t o  find a reason why things are thus 
rather than otherwise.” In  Leibniz’s feeling that the root- 
notions will be found to  be few in number, he comes still 
closer t o  the idea which I have in mind: says Leibniz, “I 
believe there are only a few primitive decrees which regulate 
the consequences of things.” Such principles as that  of 
least action” in dynamics, discovered independently by 
Leibniz and Maupertuis, seemed t o  Leibniz to  be corrob- 
orative of this mystical truth. 
Another aspect of the same idea was tacitly employed by 
Newton when he selected the second power of the distance in 
formulating his gravitational law, rather than some very 
nearby power. It may be remarked that  such quasi- 
aesthetic feelings constantly guide the efforts of any success- 
ful system-builder in science or philosophy. 
Einstein, too, has expressed a variation of the same theme 
in terms which are perhaps intended to  be theological only 
C <  
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in an allegorical sense. He declares: “Rufiniert is der Herr 
Gott, boshuft ist ET nicht”-God is subtle, He is not malicious. 
Very recently an analogous thesis has been advanced by 
Sir Arthur Eddington, seeming at  first sight t o  deny the 
necessity of experimentation. Says Eddington : “Unless the 
structure of the nucleus has a surprise in store for us, the 
conclusion seems plain-there is nothing in the whole 
system of laws of physics that cannot be deduced unam- 
biguously from epistemological considerations. An intelli- 
gence, unacquainted with our universe but acquainted with 
the system of thought by which the human mind interprets 
t o  itself the content of its sensory experience, should be able 
t o  attain all the knowledge of physics that we have attained 
by experiment. . . . For example, he would infer the exist- 
ence and properties of radium, but not the dimensions of the 
earth.” 
In  making this statement, Eddington apparently over- 
looks the fact that  today we are surrounded by instruments 
of precision; in other words all of us live in a veritable scien- 
tific laboratory, and thus acquire easily an understanding 
of certain facts of nature which the keenest observer could 
not have guessed a t  in ancient times. Eddington regards 
theories thus arrived at  as essentially subjective, but I do 
not see how this alters the basic significance of his mystical 
conclusion. 
All of these somewhat different points of view indicate a 
prevailing faith that the Order of Nature is supernal, 
combining logical simplicity and inevitability in a most re- 
markable way. Ordinary geometry affords such an account 
of space; Newtonian dynamics, of the behavior of matter in 
motion; electromagnetism, of the facts of light and electric- 
ity; etc. This belief is grounded, on the one hand, in 
scientific experience and, on the other, in the successful use 
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of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in more or less meta- 
physical form. 
U p  t o  the present point my  aim has been to  consider a 
variety of applications of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, 
without attempting any precise formulation of the Principle 
itself. With these applications in mind I will venture t o  
formulate the Principle and a related Heuristic Conjecture 
in quasi-mathematical form as follows: 
PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON. If there ap- 
pears in any theory T a set of ambiguously determined ( i e .  
symmetrically entering) variables, then these variables can them- 
selves be determined only to the extent allowed by the correspond- 
ing group G. Consequently any problem concerning these vari- 
ables which has a uniquely determined solution, must itself be 
formulated so as to be unchanged by  the operations of the group 
G ( i e .  must involve the variables symmetrically). 
The final form of any 
scientific theory T i s :  (1) based on a few simple postulates; and 
(2) contains an extensive ambiguity, associated symmetry, and 
underlying group G, in such wise that, if the language and laws 
of the theory of groups be taken f o r  granted, the whole theory T 
appears as nearly self-evident in virtue of the above Principle. 
The  Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Heuristic Con- 
jecture, as just formulated, have the advantage of not in- 
volving excessively subjective ideas, while at  the same time 
retaining the essential kernel of the matter. 
I n  my  opinion i t  is essentially this principle and this 
conjecture which are destined always t o  operate as the basic 
criteria for the scientist in extending our knowledge and 
understanding of the world. 
It is also my belief that, in so far as there is anything 
definite in the realm of Metaphysics, it  will consist in further 
applications of the same general type. This general conclu- 
HEURISTIC CONJECTURE. 
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sion may be given the following suggestive symbolic form: 
Principle of Theory of Ambiguity 
Metaphysicst~Suficient Reasont+ and Groups. 
While the skillful metaphysical use of the Principle must 
always be regarded as of dubious logical status, nevertheless 
I believe it will remain the most important weapon of the 
philosopher. 
NOTE ON THE L A W  OF THE PARALLELOGRAM OF FORCES 
In order t o  show how this law may be regarded as a kind of 
consequence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, we begin 
by laying down the following three postulates: 
(I) Collinear vector forces at  a point 0 have a resultant 
force in the same line whose magnitude is the (algebraic) sum 
of the magnitudes of the two constituent forces. 
(11) Any two forces have a unique resultant. The com- 
bination of forces into resultants is associative and com- 
mutative : 
( F  +G) +H = F+ (G + H )  ; 
F+G=G+F. 
The resultant of forces varies continuously with the constit- 
uent forces. 
(111) Principle of Suficient Reason. The resultant of two 
forces is independent of the choice of axes of reference and of 
the unit of force. 
It is easy to  show on the basis of these postulates that  the 
law of composition of forces is simply the law of vector 
addition, embodied in the so-called Parallelogram Law. 
T o  do so we remark first that  the resultant H of two non- 
collinear forces F and G cannot lie in the line of either of 
these forces. For from 
H=F+G 
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we obtain by (11) and (I) 
( - F ) + H = ( (  -F)+F)+G=G.  
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Hence if H and ( - F )  are collinear, G will be collinear with 
them by I, which is impossible. Thus H and F (and similarly 
H and G )  cannot be collinear. 
We also observe that  the unique resultant H of two forces 
F and G (see 11) must lie in their plane by the Principle of Suf- 
ficient Reason (111); for why should this resultant lie on one 
side of this plane rather than the other?  
Now let us select two orthogonal axes in any plane through 
0 and consider forces X and Y along these axes in the chosen 
positive sense, with magnitudes cos a and sin a respectively 
where a ranges from 0 to  ~ / 2 .  For a=O the resultant is a 
unit vector along the x-axis; for a = 1 the resultant is a unit 
vector along the y axis. As a varies from 0 to  ~ / 2  the result- 
ant vector O P  varies continuously by (I). Thus P describes 
a continuous curve (see figure 1). 
It is clear that  this curve can not intersect the x or y axis, 
for 0 < a  < ~ / 2 ,  by our first remark, and so must lie wholly 
within the first quadrant as indicated in the figure. Conse- 
quently Of‘ must take any desired direction in the quadrant 
a t  least once, and, since the resultant by the same Principle 
is independent of the unit selected we may decompose any 
force H whose direction falls in this quadrant into two such 
forces X and Y, 
H=X+Y. 
But there cannot be more than one such decomposition, 
for if 
then 
X+ Y = X’ + Y’, 
( X  - X’) + ( Y - Y’) = 0 ;  
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H 
X 
FIG. 1. 
whence by our first remark 
X=X’, Y = I”. 
figure, based upon our Principle, that  
Furthermore we see by the intrinsic geometry of the same 
(1) X = h p ( a )  Y=hp(.rr /2-a)  
where h and Q! designate the magnitude and angle of H ,  and 
cp is a continuous function of a such that 
p(0) =1, ~ ( 1 )  =0, O<P(Q!) for O < a < w / 2 .  
Here we have let X and Y stand (ambiguously) for the mag- 
nitudes of the vectors X and Y of specified directions. 
Next let us resolve X and Y along the direction of H and 
the perpendicular direction (see the same figure). Clearly 
we obtain 
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h = Xrp(a) + Y&/2 -a) 
The second of these relations reduces t o  an identity in virtue 
of (1) but the first yields by combination with (1) 
(2) 
and so in particular (p(n/4) = 1 / f i  
This shows that we have always 
( P " 4  +rp2(w/2 - a) = 1, 
(3) h2=X2+Y2 
in accordance with the Parallelogram Law. 
T o  complete our deduction of that  Law we now con- 
sider two forces of equal magnitude h making an angle 
a(0 < a  <7r/2) with one another as in figure 2. 
FIG. 2. 
We first resolve both of these forces along the line of one 
of them and in a perpendicular direction obtaining compo- 
nents. 
h+hq(a)  and hrp(s/2-a) 
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respectively. By (3) and (2) the resultant is therefore of 
magnitude 
([h+hcp(a)]2+h2cp2(7r/2 -a)}$ = h [ 2 ( 1  +cp(a))]4. 
Secondly we resolve along the bisector of the lines of the 
forces and perpendicularly to this bisector, obtaining com- 
ponents 
2 h p ( a / 2 )  and 0 
respectively. Hence we conclude that 
(4) cpy a / 2 )  = ~ 1 +(P(ff> 0 <a  <lr/2.  2 '  
From the companion formulas (2) and (4) we conclude 
that  for all a of the form mir/2" we have p ( a )  =cosa. I n  
fact we already have found that 
and by bisection we find next 
and so forth. But p ( a )  is continuous and so we see that for 
all a we have p ( a )  =cosa. Thus (1) takes the form 
( 5 )  
in accordance with the Parallelogram Law of resolution along 
these axes. Furthermore it is clear that  the formula ( 5 )  
holds for any a whatsoever. Hence it follows that any two 
forces HI and Hz combine in the desired manner since we 
have 
X1 = hl cos al, Y1 = hl sin al; X z  = hz cos az, Yz  = hz sin a2, 
X = h  cos a, Y=h sin a 
with resultant components, 
hlcosal +hzcosaz, hlsinal +h&az, 
in the selected directions. 
